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Special]

XVIII. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A.

Budgets

Justice McHugh addressed three issues involving the state budget in Jones
v. Rockefeller.1 208 He stated initially that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Const., art. VI, Sec. 51, the Modem Budget
Amendment, the governor's disapproval or reduction of items or
parts of items contained within the budget bill is void unless the
governor returns to each house of the legislature or files in the
the case may be, objections for
office of the secretary of state,120as
9
such disapproval or reduction.
Justice McHugh next found that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Const., art. VI, Sec. 51, the Modem Budget
Amendment, the validity of the governor's disapproval or
reduction of items or parts of items contained within the budget
bill depends upon the governor's objections to such items or parts
of items. The objections, to satisfy the mandate of the Modem
Budget Amendment, need communicate in a rational manner to
the public and current or future legislatures a statement of an
adverse reason in opposition to a budget bill, or its items or parts,
the
as to why the budget bill, or an item or part of an item within 121
0
budget bill, has been disapproved or reduced by the governor.
It was concluded in Jones that
[w]here the West Virginia Legislature passed the budget bill
containing Account No. 4160, which account enumerated
appropriations for the state mental hospitals for fiscal year
1983-84, and furthermore, the legislature produced, pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 4-1-18 [1969], a legislative digest directing specific
appropriations within Account No. 4160 to Spencer Hospital, a
subsequent reduction by the governor of appropriations within,
Account No. 4160 of the budget bill, which reductions would
result in the closing or substantial curtailment of services at
Spencer Hospital, was void under W.Va. Const., art. VI, Sec. 51,
the Modem Budget Amendment, because the governor failed to
file objections to those appropriations, as required by the

1208

303 S.E.2d 668 (W. Va. 1983).

1209

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1210

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Amendment, where (1) the governor merely struck through certain
appropriations, substituted reduced amounts, and added his
initials, (2) the governor's message filed with the budget bill
described the effects of the governor's reduction of appropriations
upon certain state hospitals, rather than adverse reasons why
appropriations for Spencer Hospital should be reduced and (3) the
governor's message filed with the budget bill merely stated a
general desire by the governor to eliminate the1 21duplication
of
1
administrative costs with respect to state hospitals.
Justice McHugh addressed the failure by the governor to submit a budget
for a state agency in State ex rel. Steele v. Kopp.1212 The court held:
Where the West Virginia legislature pursuant to its authority to
regulate nonintoxicating beer in this State created, under the
Nonintoxicating Beer Act, the office of the West Virginia
nonintoxicating beer commissioner, and the statute creating that
office provided a deputy commissioner and employees or agents
to aid the commissioner in his or her duties, and where (1) the
governor submitted a proposed budget for fiscal year 1983-84 to
the legislature during its Regular Session in which the governor
did not request appropriations for the office of the nonintoxicating
beer commissioner, and (2) upon presentation to the governor of
the budget bill as passed by the legislature, the governor
effectively eliminated the functions of the office of the
nonintoxicating beer commissioner by reducing legislative
appropriations for that office to zero, except for the
commissioner's salary and $50,000, the actions of the governor
violated W.Va. Const., art. V, Sec. 1, concerning the separation of
powers of government in this State, and W.Va. Const.,1 213
art. VI,
Sec. 51, concerning this State's annual budgetary process.
In State ex rel. Lambert v. Cortellessi,1214 Justice McHugh held:
The county commission is expressly granted the power to
administer the fiscal affairs of the county by W.Va. Const. art. IX,
Sec. 11, and pursuant thereto, the legislature, in W.Va. Code,
7-7-7, as amended, has included the circuit clerk as a county

1211

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1212

305 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1983).

1213

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1214

386 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1989).
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officer whose budget is fixed by the county commission.121

B.

Public Funds

State ex reL Manchin v. West Virginia Secondary School Activities
Commission2 1 6 required Justice McHugh to categorize funds received by a county
education agency. He stated:
Funds received by the West Virginia Secondary School Activities
Commission, which Commission operates pursuant to authority
granted it by county boards of education under W.Va. Code,
18-2-25 [1967], are "quasi-public funds" as defined in W.Va.
Code, 18-5-13 [19871, and are to be accounted for in a manner
similar to that provided for funds of county boards of education,
but such funds are not to be.accounted 1217
for under W.Va. Code,
12-2-2 [1983] as "moneys due the State.,
C.

Salariesand Wages

Justice McHugh held in Sell v. Chaplin1218 that "[an increase in salary for
a municipal officer may not be made pursuant to an ordinance enacted after the
beginning of such officer's term of office, although a provision for the increase was
included in1' 2a19municipal budget approved before the beginning of the officer's term
of office.'

In Maynard v. Board of Education of Wayne County,"' 0 Justice McHugh
held that "[a] county board of education is not immune from contractual liability to
its employees for unpaid salaries because it followed the directives of the State
Superintendent of Schools."'21°
Justice McHugh was required to determine the legality of using special
levy funds to supplement the salary of county board of education employees in the
case of Bane v. BoardofEducation of Monongalia County.' 22 The court held that
[w]here the voters by their approval of a special levy do not
require that each employee of the county board of education is to
1215

Id at Syl. PL 3.

1216

364 S.E.2d 25 (W. Va. 1987).

1217

d at SylPt. 1.

1218

285 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 1981).

1219

Id at Syl.

1220

357 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1987).

1221

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1222

364 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1987).
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receive a designated amount of supplemental salary, the board of
education may annually exercise sound discretion in allocating the
special levy funds as salary supplements among its employees. A
court may not interfere with such exercise of discretion, unless
there is a clear showing of fraud, collusion or palpable abuse of
discretion, or unless there is a clear showing of a violation of
W.Va. Code, 18A-4-8, as amended, or its current statutory
replacement, with respect to its uniformity provisions or 23its
provisions on the nonreduction of local funds in the aggregate.'2
Justice McHugh held in Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Education of Upshur

County'224 that "[u]nder W.Va. Code, 18A-4-5 [1969] and its successor, W.Va.
Code, 18A-4-5a [1984], once a county board of education pays additional
compensation to certain teachers, it must pay the same amount of additional
5
compensation to other teachers performing 'like assignments and duties[.]' ,122
Justice McHugh stated in Courtney v. State Department of Health of West
Virginia1226 that

W.Va. Code, 5-5-2 [1984] does not require an employee to be
employed on the first day of the ensuing fiscal year in order to be
entitled to receive an annual incremental salary increase provided
by that statutory provision. Rather, the first day of any fiscal year
is the date
upon which the incremental salary increase is to be
1227
received.
D.

Contracts

Justice McHugh held in Corte Co. v. County Commission of McDowell
County,1228 that "[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 56-6-27 [1931], a county commission

may be liable, in an action founded on contract, for interest on the principal due, or
any part thereof,
at the time of trial, after allowing all proper credits, payments and
229
sets off."1
The court also stated:
When a contract is entered into between a county commission and
a contractor for certain construction work and the contractor
1223

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1224

369 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988).

1225

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alteration in original).

1226

388 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1989).

1227

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1228

299 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1982).

1229

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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knew, or had reason to believe, that funds from the federal
government would be used for such work, then the contractor may
not recover interest on the amount owed by the county
commission if a delay in payment from the federal government
occurs, provided that the county commission makes a reasonable
effort to123
ensure
that payment of the debt will be made in a timely
0
manner.

E.

Indemnity Bond Given by PublicOfficials

Justice McHugh expounded upon what constitutes a breach of a condition
of an indemnity bond by a public official in State ex rel. Hardesty v. Stalnaker.'23'
The court held:
A bond given by a public officer providing that such officer shall
faithfully discharge or perform the duties of his office and shall
account for and pay over all monies which may come into [the]
hands [of] such public officer[,] is breached within the meaning of
W.Va. Code, 6-2-3 (1923), upon the failure of such officer to
return to the appropriate governmental entity overpayments in
salary, such statute in part conditioning bonds upon an accounting
for and paying over of all monies received by virtue of such public
officer's office or employment. 232
F.

Recovery of LitigationFees and Costs by State

In Hechlerv. Casey l 2m Justice McHugh ruled that "W.Va.R.App.P. 23(b)
expressly precludes an award of costs for the benefit of the State or an agency or
officer thereof in a case before this Court."' 12 3 The court also held that
[t]he State or an agency or an officer thereof which was
represented by the Attorney General in proceedings to dissolve an
injunction may not, under W.Va. Code, 53-5-9 [1931], recover
reasonable attorney fees incurred in such proceedings because the
State has not been "damaged" by payment
of the salaries of the
23
regular staff of the Attorney General. 5

1230

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

1231

280 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 1981).

1232

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (alterations in original).

123

333 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1985).

1234

Itt
at Syl. Pt. 14.

1235

Id. at Syl. Pt. 15.
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Public Policy

In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.,1236 Justice McHugh addressed
the issue of whether courts or juries determine public policy in litigation. Justice
McHugh held that "[a] determination of the existence of public policy in West
Virginia is a question of law, rather than a question of fact for a jury.' 2 37
H.

Freedomof Information

The case of Hechler v. Casey1238 required Justice McHugh to elaborate on
the Freedom of Information Act in the context of disclosing names and addresses of
security guards maintained by the secretary of state. Justice McHugh noted initially
that "[t]he disclosure provisions of this State's Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.
Code, 29B-1-1 et seq., as amended, are to be liberally construed, and the
exemptions to such Act are to be strictly construed."' 1239 The court indicated that
"[a]n agreement as to confidentiality between the public body and the supplier of
the information may not override the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code,
29B-1-1 et seq."' 240 Justice McHugh held that "[t]he primary purpose of the
invasion of privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code,
29B-1-4(2) [1977], is to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that
can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.' 124' It was said
that "[u]nder W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(2) [1977], a court must balance
or weigh the
242
individual's right of privacy against the public's right to know." 1
Turning to the factual issue in Hechler, Justice McHugh wrote:
W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(2) [1977] does not normally exempt from
disclosure an individual's name and residential address because
they are not "personal" or "private" facts but are public in nature
in that they constitute information normally shared with strangers
and are ascertainable by reference to many publicly obtainable
books and records. Thus, disclosure of an individual's name and
residential
address would not result in an unreasonable invasion of
124 3
privacy.

1236

325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).

1237

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1238

333 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1985).

1239

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1240

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1241

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1242

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

1243

Hechler, 333 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 8.
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The court further held that
W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(2) [1977] does not exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act a list of names and
addresses of security guards furnished to the Secretary of State
pursuant to his licensing and regulation of the guards' employer,
since such information constitutes public
244 facts and since the risk
of harm from disclosure is speculative.'
Justice McHugh ruled that "[t]he primary purpose of the law enforcement
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(4) [1977], is
to prevent premature disclosure of investigatory materials which might be used in a
law enforcement action."' 1245
In Hechler, Justice McHugh went on to state that "'[r]ecords... that deal
with the detection and investigation of crime,' within the meaning of W.Va. Code,
29B-1-4(4) [1977], do not include information generated pursuant to routine
administration or oversight, but is limited to information compiled as part of an
inquiry into specific suspected violations of the law.' ' 1246 Justice McHugh clarified
matters in finding that "[t]he language, 'internal records and notations... which
are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement,' within the
meaning of W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(4) [1977], refers to confidential investigative
techniques and procedures."1 247 It was further concluded:
W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(4) [1977] does not exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act a list of names and
addresses of security guards furnished to the Secretary of State
pursuant to his licensing and regulation of the guards' employer,
since such information was not part of an inquiry into specific
suspected violations but was generated pursuant to routine
administration of W.Va. Code, 30-18-1 et seq. and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, and does not reveal confidential
investigative techniques or procedures. 1248
Justice McHugh confronted the Freedom of Information Act in Daily
Gazette Co. v. Withrow. 249 The court held initially that
[a] release or other litigation settlement document in which one of
1244

Id. at Syl. PL 9.

1245

Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.

1246

Id. at Syl. PL 11 (alteration in original).

1247

Id. at Syl. PL 12 (alteration in original).

1248

Hechler, 333 S.E.2d at Syl. PL 13.

1249

350 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1986).
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the parties is a public body, involving an act or omission of the
public body in the public body's official capacity, is a "public
record" within the meaning of a freedom of information statute,
such as W.Va. Code, 29B-1-2(4), as amended, defining a "public
record" as a writing which contains
information "relating to the
1 250
conduct of the public's business[.]"
The court then stated that
[f]ack of possession of an existing writing by a public body at the
time of a request under the State's Freedom of Information Act is
not by itself determinative of the question whether the writing is a
"public record" under W.Va. Code, 29B-1-2(4), as amended,
which defines a "public record" as a writing "retained by a public
body." The writing is "retained" if it is subject to the control of
the public body.125 '
Justice McHugh noted in Withrow that "[a]ssurances of confidentiality do
not justify withholding public information from the public; such assurances by their
own force do not transform a public record into a private record for the purpose of
the State's Freedom of Information Act.' 125 2 The court pointed out that "[a] public
official has a common law duty to create and maintain, for public inspection and
copying, a record of the terms of settlement of litigation brought against the public
official or his or her employee(s) in their official capacity."' 1253 Finally, the court
concluded that "[f]or a person prevailing in an action under the State's Freedom of
Information Act to recover reasonable attorney's fees, the evidence before the trial
court must show bad faith, vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct on the part of
the custodian of the public record(s)." 1254
Justice McHugh ruled in Keegan v. Bailey1255 that "[u]nless records of
stale dated warrants are presumed to be abandoned property as defined by W.Va.
Code, 36-8-8b(a) [Supp.1990], such records of stale dated warrants are subject to
disclosure
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code, 29B-1-1, et
6
seq."1

25

Justice McHugh held in Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Development

1250

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

1251

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1252

Id. at Syl. PL 4.

1253

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1254

Withrow, 350 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 6.

1255

443 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1994).

1256

Id. at Syl.
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Office' 2 ' that

[w]hen a public body asserts that certain documents in its
possession are exempt from disclosure under W.Va. Code,
29B-1-4(8) [1977], on the ground that those documents are
"internal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public
body," the public body must produce a Vaughn index named for
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974). The Vaughn
index must provide a relatively detailed justification as to why
each document is exempt, specifically identifying the reasons why
W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(8) [1977] is relevant and correlating the
claimed exemption with the t particular part of the withheld
document to which the claimed exemption applies. The Vaughn
index need not be so detailed that it compromises the privilege
claimed. The public body must also submit an affidavit, indicating
why disclosure of the documents would be harmful and why such
1 58
documents should be exempt.L
The court also stated in Daily Gazette that
W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(8) [1977], which exempts from disclosure
"internal memoranda or letters received or prepared by any public
body" specifically exempts from disclosure only those written
internal government communications consisting of advice,
opinions and recommendations which reflect a public body's
deliberative, decision-making process; written advice, opinions
and recommendations from one public body to another; and
written advice, opinions and recommendations to a public body
from outside consultants or experts obtained during the public
body's deliberative, decision-making process. W.Va. Code,
29B-1-4(8) [1977] does not exempt from disclosure written
communications between a public body and private persons or
entities where such communications do not consist of advice,
opinions or recommendations to the public body from outside
consultants or experts obtained during
the public body's
1259
deliberative, decision-making process.

1257

482 S.E.2d 180 (W. Va. 1996).

1258

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1259

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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Obligationsof Public Officer

In Graf v. Frame,1260 Justice McHugh addressed the general obligations of
public officers and a specific area of conflict of interest involving public officers
who are also practicing attorneys. The court held initially that
[o]ne who accepts a public office does so cum onere, that is, he
assumes the burdens and [the] obligations of the office as well as
its benefits, subjects himself to all constitutional and legislative
provisions relating to the office, and undertakes to perform all
[the] duties imposed on its occupant; and while he remains in such
office he must perform all such duties.1261
The court then pointed out that
W.Va. Const. art. III, § 2 imposes a duty upon a public officer
who is an attorney to refrain from representing persons who
allegedly have claims against the public agency of which he is a
member or against those agencies or employees thereof subject
to
1 262
the supervision of the public agency of which he is a member.
J.

Enactment of Ordinance

In the case of Perdue v. Ferguson,12 6 Justice McHugh was called upon to
address the propriety of courts exercising discretion to become involved with the
enactment of ordinances. The court held that
[a] court of equity normally may not enjoin a municipal legislative
body from exercising legislative powers by enacting a municipal
ordinance. This principle that an injunction does not lie to restrain
enactment of an ordinance applies generally even though the
proposed
1264ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or otherwise

invalid.

Justice McHugh reasoned that "[i]t is presumed that an ordinance,
especially one concerning the public health, safety or welfare, was passed in good
faith and that the legislative body of the municipality acted in the best interest of

1260

352 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 1986).

1261

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (alteration in original).

1262

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1263

350 S.E.2d 555 (W. Va. 1986).

1264

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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the community.'

12 0

Consequently, Justice McHugh held:

An injunction does not lie to restrain the enforcement of an invalid
municipal ordinance merely because the ordinance is
unconstitutional, arbitrary or otherwise invalid; other
circumstances, such as irreparable injury, inadequacy of remedies
at law, etc., bringing the case within one or more of the grounds
for equity jurisdiction must also be alleged and shown. 266
The court concluded that "[w]here a municipal corporation or the officers
thereof act within well-recognized powers, or exercise discretionary power, a court
is unwarranted in interfering by granting an injunction, unless fraud is shown, or
or discretion is being manifestly abused, to the oppression of the
the power
1267
citizen."
In Par Mar v. City of Parkersburg,1268 Justice McHugh stated that "[a]
zoning ordinance must draw lines for boundaries between zoning districts, and such
line drawing, such as utilizing a highway or a street as a boundary, is not ipso facto
unreasonable' so as to invalidate the application of a zoning
'arbitrary and
26 9
ordinance. '1

K.

Referendum

Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Fosterv. City of Morgantown 270 that
"[a] municipal charter provision, granting to the qualified voters of a municipality
the power of referendum to require reconsideration by the city council of any
adopted ordinance, may not supersede W.Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969], which does not
authorize a referendum with respect to amendments to zoning ordinances. ' 27'
L.

Action Against Government

Justice McHugh held in Wolfe v. City of Wheeling 272 that "[t]he question
of whether a special duty arises to protect an individual from a local governmental
entity's negligence in the performance of a nondiscretionary governmental function

1265

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.

1266

Id.at Syl. Pt. 3.

1267

Id at Syl. PL 4.

1268

398 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1990).

1269

Id at Syl. Pt. 3.

1270

432 S.E.2d 195 (W. Va. 1993).

1271

Id at Syl. Pt. 4.

1272

387 S.E.2d 307 (W. Va. 1989).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 22
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of the facts.' ' 1 27 3 The court also stated:
To establish that a special relationship exists between a local
governmental entity and an individual, which is the basis for a
special duty of care owed to such individual, the following
elements must be shown: (1) an assumption by the local
governmental entity, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2)
knowledge on the part of the local governmental entity's agents
that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact
between the local governmental entity's agents and the injured
party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance
on the local
1274
governmental entity's affirmative undertaking.
Justice McHugh addressed statutory immunity for political subdivisions in
the case of Randall v. Fairmont City Police Department.1275 The court held that
W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(5) [1986], which provides, in relevant
part, that a political subdivision is immune from tort liability for
"the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police, law
enforcement or fire protection[]" is coextensive with the
common-law rule not recognizing a cause of action for the breach
of a general duty to provide, or the method of providing, such
protection owed to the public as a whole. Lacking a clear
expression to the contrary, that statute incorporates the
common-law special duty rule and does not immunize a breach of
a special duty to provide, or the method of providing, such
protection to a particular individual. 27 6
Justice McHugh addressed the immunity of political subdivisions from
liability for matters arising from their licensing powers and functions in the case of
Hose v. Berkeley County Planning Commission.12 77 The court held initially that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986] and W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986], a political subdivision is immune
from liability if a loss or claim results from licensing powers or
functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of
or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authority, regardless
1273

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1274

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1275

412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991).

1276

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8 (alteration in original).

1277

460 S.E.2d 761 (W. Va. 1995).
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of whether such loss or claim is caused by the negligent
performance of acts by the political subdivision's
employees
1278
while acting within the scope of employment.
The court held next that
W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] clearly contemplates
immunity for political subdivisions from tort liability for any loss
or claim resulting from licensing powers or functions such as the
issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of or failure or refusal
to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authority, regardless of the existence of
a special duty relationship. 279
Justice McHugh concluded in Hose that
[w]hile W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] expressly immunizes
a political subdivision from liability if a loss or claim results from
licensing powers or. functions such as the issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of or failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order
or similar authority, such immunity does not extend to private
individuals or entities to which a political subdivision has issued,
denied, suspended, or revoked or has failed or refused to issue,
deny, suspend or revoke any
1280 permit, license, certificate, approval,
order or similar authority.
In Koffler v. City of Huntington,128 ' Justice McHugh held that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986], political subdivisions
are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused
by their negligent failure to keep public roads, highways, streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public
grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free
from nuisance, except that it is a full defense to such liability,
when a bridge within a municipality is involved, that the
municipality does not have the responsibility for maintaining or
inspecting the bridge. A political subdivision's duty to keep its
public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds open, in repair, or
1278

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1279

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1280

Id. at Syl. PL 6.

1281

469 S.E.2d 645 (W. Va. 1996).
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free from nuisance
does not extend exclusively to vehicles or
1282
vehicular travel.
In Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville,1283 Justice McHugh wrote:
Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986] and W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a)(3) [1986], a political subdivision is immune from
liability if a loss or claim results from the execution or
enforcement of the lawful orders of any court regardless of
whether such loss or claim is caused by the negligent performance
of acts by the political subdivision's
employees while acting
84
within the scope of employment.12
Justice McHugh wrote in Holsten v. Massey12 8 that
[t]he wanton or reckless conduct exception to an employee's (as
the term "employee" is defined in the Governmental Tort Claims
and Insurance Reform Act) immunity under W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(b)(2) [1986] of the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act is an exception to the public duty doctrine
separate and distinct from the common-law
special relationship
128
exception to the public duty doctrine.
The decision also held that "W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(5) [1986] clearly

contemplates immunity for a political subdivision from tort liability
for 'the failure
287
to provide.., police [or] law enforcement... protection.'"1
M.

Terminationof Government Employees for PoliticalReasons

Justice McHugh addressed the security of government employees from
termination due to political reasons in the case of Adkins v. Miller.1288 The court
held that
[t]he first amendment to the United States Constitution and article
III, section 7 of the West Virginia Constitution do not confer any

right upon a governmental employee to continued employment.
1282

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1283

477 S.E.2d 525 (W. Va. 1996).

1284

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1285

490 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1997).

1286

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1287

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8 (alterations in original).

1288

421 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1992).
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Under certain circumstances, those provisions do, however,
extend a protection to governmental employees to be free from
employment decisions made solely for political reasons.
Therefore, W.Va. Code, 7-7-7 [1982] may not be interpreted as
permitting a governmental employer to make employment
decisions based solely upon political reasons, unless the
employees hold certain types of positions.1289
XIX. ELECTION LAW

A.

Recall Official

In the case of State ex rel. Durkin v. Neely, 1290 taxpayers petitioned a
circuit court for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk of a municipality to certify
the sufficiency of a petition to recall certain members of city council at a special
election. The circuit court denied the writ and the taxpayers appealed. Writing for
the court, Justice McHugh found a technical problem with the appeal and held:
If, pending an appeal to an order denying a writ of mandamus to
require a clerk of a municipality to certify the sufficiency of a
petition to recall certain members of a city council at a special
election, and the city charter requires the council to cause such
special election to be held "unless the general municipal election
shall occur within one hundred twenty days from" the date the
petition is certified as sufficient, and the next general municipal
election is scheduled within one hundred129
twenty days when the
case is heard, the appeal will be dismissed. '
B.

Qualificationsto be a Candidatefor Public Office

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of restrictions on a person's right to
run for office in the case of Sturm v. Henderson.'29 2 The court said initially that
"[t]he right to become a candidate for public office is a fundamental right, and
restrictions upon that right are subject to constitutional scrutiny.' ' 129 3 Justice
McHugh then stated that
W.Va. Code, 18-5-1 [1945], and W.Va. Code, 3-5-6 [1978], to the
extent that they contain a provision that no more than a certain
1289

I at Syl. Pt. 2.

1290

276 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1981).

1291

Id. at syl. Pt. 2.

1292

342 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1986).

1293

Id. at Syl. PL 1.
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